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In a speech at the National Defense University on 11 of February 2004, President George W. 
Bush proposed a series of steps to upgrade the nuclear non-proliferation regime.[1] While he may 
have outlined the nuclear non-proliferation agenda for the next 25 years, what is missing is an 
introspective attitude.  
After the disclosures of the secret nuclear weapons programs in North Korea, Iran and Libya, the 
nuclear non-proliferation regime is more than ever on the brink of collapse. Colonel Khadafi 
accelerated the process. Last December, after nine months of secret negotiations with the US 
and the UK, he agreed to halt all Libyan weapons of mass destruction programs in exchange for 
breaking up the isolationist situation in which the country had positioned itself. Economic recovery 
and consequently the political survival of the regime are the drivers behind this move. Many 
observers were surprised by the extent of the network behind the Libyan nuclear program. It not 
only pointed to the Pakistani metallurgist Dr. A.Q. Khan, but also to private entities in Malaysia, 
Dubai, China and Western Europe. The knowledge to build nuclear weapons is far more 
widespread than previously known.  
The biggest difficulty in producing a nuclear weapon consists of acquiring the necessary amount 
of fissile material—highly enriched uranium or plutonium—as well as the knowledge to weaponize 
it. Much of that information is now available on the Internet or on sale on the black market. The 
worst-case scenario is that terrorist organizations like Al Qaeda get their hands on it. Unlike using 
it as deterrent, catastrophic terrorists will simply use it as an ordinary weapon, possibly causing a 
man-made disaster on a scale that has never been seen before. 
That is why Bush recently proposed doing everything that is possible to make the lives of 
potential proliferators—both state and non-state actors—much more difficult. "We will stop these 
weapons from being acquired or built. We'll block them from being transferred. We'll prevent them 
from being used," he promised.[2] More in particular, he asked to expand both the Proliferation 
Security Initiative and the Cooperative Threat Reduction program. The latter, which attempts to 
secure the Russian nuclear legacy, is the successor of the Nunn-Lugar program that was 
established in the beginning of the nineties. The former is an initiative by Bush in May 2003 that 
aims at preventing the export of sensitive nuclear materials by intercepting ships and by denying 
suspicious aircraft overflight rights. In his latest initiative, Bush also called for a Security Council 
resolution requiring states to criminalize proliferation. 
Bush's most far-reaching and controversial proposal was to forbid states from acquiring 
enrichment and reprocessing equipment, unless they already possess the knowledge and the 
infrastructure for enrichment and reprocessing, which is for instance not the case for Iran. It would 
set a ceiling on the number of states that would be able to produce nuclear weapons 
indigenously. In addition, Bush proposed that states that would like to get help for their civilian 
nuclear programs first be required to ratify the Additional Protocol of the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA). In exchange, he asked the nuclear suppliers—the forty members of the 
Nuclear Suppliers Group—to guarantee the rest of the world reasonably priced nuclear fuel. 
This initiative should be welcomed. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) has indeed, as 
Bush said, "a loophole which had been exploited by nations such as North Korea and Iran." More 
in particular, proliferating states "are allowed to produce nuclear material that can be used to 
build bombs under the cover of civilian nuclear programs."[3] Under the treaty, they are obliged to 
declare their programs to the IAEA. But in case they do not and as long as they are not caught, 
non-nuclear weapon states can in principle build nuclear weapons in secret, and withdraw from 
the treaty once they succeed. That is what North Korea did, or at least what it tried to make us 
believe it did. 
There are, however, some substantial caveats with Bush's recent initiative. The first and foremost 
problem is that his proposals go against the spirit of the NPT, which is even by the US still 
recognized as being the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The NPT, which was 
signed in 1968, was a deal between the five existing nuclear weapon states that were recognized 
as such in the treaty—the United States, the Soviet Union, China, France and the United 
Kingdom—and the other countries of the world. The latter would sign the treaty as Non-Nuclear 
Weapon State (NNWS) and promise not to acquire nuclear weapons. At the same time, under 
Article 4 of the treaty, the Non-Nuclear Weapon States were promised help with their civilian 
nuclear programs. Although this provision was at that time inserted as a result of a request by 
European non-nuclear weapon states like Germany and Belgium, nowadays countries like Brazil, 
Egypt and South Korea have a particular interest in this quid pro quo. The recent proposals 
undermine the deal as they add obligations for the NNWS. This reasoning applies at least 
indirectly, as Bush is playing the card of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, knowing very well that the 
NPT itself cannot be amended. 
What is neglected in this discussion is the second part of the NPT deal. The NNWS only agreed 
to abstain from acquiring nuclear weapons because the NWS agreed to dismantle their nuclear 
weapons in turn.[5] This promise, articulated in article 6 of the NPT, became even more 
prominent when the treaty was extended indefinitely in 1995. The NNWS agreed at that time on 
the condition of "the determined pursuit by the NWS of systematic and progressive efforts to 
reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons." At the 
2000 NPT Review Conference, this language was further strengthened.  
Nevertheless, there are nowadays, according to numbers provided by IAEA Director El Baradei, 
still 30,000 nuclear weapons on earth. One can wonder how "determined" the pursuit by the NWS 
is to eliminate their nuclear weapons. Bush did not say anything on this account in his recent 
remarks. While gradual reductions in the force structure of the former superpowers are taking 
place, it is clear that the political will to eliminate the nuclear weapons arsenals simply does not 
exist. The Bush administration is for the first time even spending money for the development of 
new types of nuclear weapons, namely for nuclear bunker-busters and mini-nukes. This is 
completely at odds with article 6 of the NPT. As a result, if the NWS do not fulfill their obligations, 
why should the NNWS agree with theirs-let alone assume additional ones? Last but not least, if 
reprocessing is such a sensitive thing, would it not be in the interest of the United States to lead 
by example and halt its own reprocessing plans?  
Second, the double-standards criticism can be expanded. It is one thing to ask others to ratify the 
Additional Protocol of the IAEA. But what about the United States itself? After having unjustifiably 
criticized the IAEA on different occasions, the Bush administration only submitted the 1997 
Additional Protocol to the Senate in 2002. Although the Protocol was already signed by the 
Clinton administration in 1998, it was only ratified on March 31, 2004. When submitting it to the 
U.S. Senate, the Bush administration added a national security exclusion prohibiting inspections 
of US nuclear weapons activities and restricted inspections at its civil nuclear energy program in 
case there is "direct national security significance." Even private American nuclear companies 
can object to the IAEA inspections.[6] This undermines not only the spirit of the Additional 
Protocol, but calls into question the credibility of the recent Bush proposals. The same logic 
applies to the Cooperative Threat Reduction program whose funding has been cut by ten percent 
in the 2005 budget request. And if Bush wants to criminalize proliferators, why not start with 
Khan, the godfather of the Pakistani atomic bomb, who has admitted selling sensitive nuclear 
weapons materials and blueprints to countries like North Korea, Iran, and Libya?  
To conclude, talking about compliance and strengthening export-controls is already a step 
forward in comparison with a doctrine that focuses on pre-emptive or preventive strikes. This 
move can be partially explained by the presidential elections and difficulties the United States is 
facing in Afghanistan and Iraq. But fundamentally, the Bush administration still does not believe 
that arms control does control arms, as Colin Gray once prosaically stated.[7] The Bush 
administration likes to "cherry pick" treaties and protocols, or more accurately articles in treaties 
and protocols. It omits, un-subscribes, or abolishes those that constrain the power of the United 
States.  
If the goal is to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime in a credible way, the new deal 
should be a combination of the Bush proposals on the one hand and a clear commitment, 
including a timetable, on behalf of the nuclear weapon states for nuclear elimination on the other. 
The idea of nuclear elimination is mostly regarded as naive and unrealistic. The fact that people 
like physicist and Nobel Peace Prize Winner Joseph Rotblat,[8] former Secretary of Defense 
McNamara,[9] former head of U.S. Strategic Command General (retired) Lee Butler,[10] and 
IAEA Director El Baradei,[11] see it as the only realistic option, does apparently not provoke a 
change of minds. To think that a several states can forever maintain thousands of nuclear 
weapons, many on alert, without accidents and without further proliferation, including crossing the 
threshold of nuclear terrorism, seems even more idealistic.  
Now is the time to rethink the nuclear order. Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, while in office, tried, 
but failed because of bureaucratic inertia.[12] Now is the time to try again.  
  
For more insights into contemporary international security issues, see our Strategic Insights 
home page. 
To have new issues of Strategic Insights delivered to your Inbox at the beginning of each 
month, email ccc@nps.edu with subject line "Subscribe". There is no charge, and your 
address will be used for no other purpose. 
About the Author 
Dr.Tom Sauer is a post-doctoral research fellow of the Flemish Fund for Scientific Research and 
a lecturer at the Department of Politics of the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven (Catholic University 
of Leuven), Belgium. His book Nuclear Arms Control was published by Macmillan in 1998. He has 
published articles in The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Security Dialogue, Contemporary 
Security Policy, Defense and Security Analysis, BCSIA Discussion Papers, European Voice, and 
International Spectator. 
References 
1. The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 'President Announces New Measures to 
Counter the Threat of WMD," February 11, 2004. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid. 
4. Joseph Cirincione, "President Bush's New Plan to Stop Proliferation," YaleGlobal Online, 
February 13, 2004. 
5. See also Adil Najam, "Getting Rid of All Nuclear Arms," USA Today, February 19, 2004. 
6. Bennett Ramberg, "US Has Nuclear Double Standard," The Baltimore Sun, February 18, 2004. 
7. Colin Gray, "Arms Control Does Not Control Arms," Orbis (Summer 1993): pp. 333-348. 
8. Joseph Rotblat, et al, eds., A Nuclear Weapon Free World: Desirable? Feasible? (Boulder, 
Colo.: Westview Press, 1993). 
9. Robert McNamara, "The Military Role of Nuclear Weapons: Perceptions and Misperceptions," 
Foreign Affairs (Fall 1983). 
10. Lee Butler, "We Still Drift Toward 'Unparalleled Catastrophe,'" International Herald Tribune, 
January 23, 1997. 
11. Mohamed ElBaradei, "Towards a Safer World," The Economist, October 17 2003. 
12. Janne Nolan, An Elusive Consensus, Brookings Institution, 1999. 
 
